The puzzle of later male retirement by Richard Johnson




or decades until 1985, the share of older American men who
worked for pay trended downward. Since 1985, though, that
share has been stable or rising. By 2001, the new trend in male
retirement behavior had added 2 million workers to the U.S. labor
force.1 Since the number of older men in the United States will increase
dramatically as the baby-boom generation ages, the new trend could
become even more significant for the U.S. economy in the future.
Understanding male retirement behavior is important to both mon-
etary and fiscal policymakers. Later retirement affects monetary policy
by increasing potential output. It also affects fiscal balances by boosting
tax revenues and reducing the cost of earnings-tested benefits such as
disability insurance and Medicaid.
Economists have put forth several theories to explain why Ameri-
can men are retiring later. One theory is that Social Security reforms
have encouraged older men to work more. Another is that the decline
in the number of workers with defined-benefit pensions has enabled
men to continue working longer. A third theory is that the slower
growth of the overall U.S. labor force has increased older men’s employ-
ment opportunities.
Richard Johnson is an economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. This
article is on the bank’s website at www.kc.frb.org.
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This article tests whether these theories explain the changed male
retirement trend. The first section reviews trends in the labor supply of
older American men. The second section examines the effects of Social
Security reforms. The third section tests the defined-benefit pension
plan theory, and the fourth section considers the slower labor-force-
growth theory. The fifth section discusses other possible explanations of
the change in the male retirement trend. The article concludes that
Social Security reforms have increased the labor supply of men aged 65
and older, but that the abrupt change in the trend of male retirement
ages in 1985 remains a puzzle. 
I. TRENDS IN OLDER MEN’S LABOR SUPPLY
This section examines the trends in older men’s labor supply in the
United States since the 1950s. Older men’s labor supply fell steadily
until around 1985. Since then, it has been roughly stable, with
increases at higher ages. While older men’s labor supply could not have
declined at its pre-1985 rate forever, it could have declined far below
its 1985 levels. 
A useful measure of older people’s labor supply is the labor-force
participation rate in older age groups. This is the proportion, within
each age group, of people either employed or unemployed and looking
for work. Falling rates of labor-force participation among older men
imply that men are retiring earlier on average.2
Labor-force participation rates for narrow age groups reveal more
about retirement behavior than those for broad age groups. The partic-
ipation rate in a broad age group can change purely because its
composition is changing over time. For example, the age group “men
aged 65 and above” now contains far more men aged 80 to 90 than it
did in 1950. These older men are unlikely to work. Thus, even if labor-
force participation rates at each age remain constant, lengthening life
spans tend to make the labor-force participation rate of men aged 65
and above fall steadily over time. For this reason this article examines
participation rates of men at single years of age and in five-year-wide
age groups, such as ages 60-64.ECONOMIC REVIEW • THIRD QUARTER 2002 7
The male labor-force participation rate in both the 60-64 and 65-69
age groups fell steadily from the 1950s to around 1985 (Chart 1).3 The
participation rate at ages 60-64 stabilized after 1985 and rose slightly in
the 1990s. The participation rate at ages 65-69 abruptly reversed course
in 1985, and has risen steadily since then. By 2001, male participation
rates in both the 60-64 and 65-69 age groups were around 20 percentage
points higher than they would have been had the trends of 1957-85 con-
tinued to 2001. The appendix presents the results of an empirical analysis
that confirms a break in 1985 in the trends of the participation rates of
both age groups, and tests the main explanations of it advanced later in
this article. 
The labor-force participation declines of 1957-85 could not have
continued forever, since negative participation rates are impossible. The
participation rate of men aged 60-64 could, however, have fallen below
the 56 percent it reached in 1985. Similarly, the participation rate at
ages 65-69 could have fallen or remained stable after 1985, rather than
rising. Thus, there is a genuine puzzle as to why older American men’s
labor-force participation trends changed around 1985.
Chart 1 
LABOR-FORCE PARTICIPATION RATES OF MEN AGED
60-64 AND 65-69
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Economists have suggested several explanations of this change in
the male retirement trend but have not tested all of them. Social Secu-
rity and employer pensions are often argued to affect retirement ages, so
changes to each type of pension could have caused the male retirement
trend to change after 1985. The changing growth rate of the overall
labor force may also have led to earlier male retirement in the 1970s
and later male retirement afterward.
II. THE EFFECTS OF SOCIAL SECURITY REFORMS
Social Security has affected the retirement choices of many Ameri-
can workers since its creation in 1935. Since 1980, reforms to Social
Security have reduced benefits, provoked fears of future benefit reduc-
tions, and removed the system’s penalty for working beyond age 65.
Any of these factors could have led men to retire later than they other-
wise would have.
Reductions in Social Security benefits
The inclusion of some Social Security benefits in taxable income
has reduced their value to beneficiaries. Congress first taxed Social Secu-
rity benefits in 1983, and it increased the tax rate on them in 1993. By
reducing men’s disposable incomes, these legislative changes may have
led them to retire later.4
The Social Security recipients whose benefits are taxed are those
with higher incomes when they claim benefits. The 1983 amendments
made up to half of Social Security benefits taxable for people with
incomes above certain thresholds. For example, in 1983 a married
couple filing taxes jointly had to pay income tax on up to half their
Social Security benefits if their gross income, defined as their adjusted
gross income plus half their benefits, exceeded $32,000. The 1993
amendments further reduced the benefits of the highest-income recipi-
ents, making up to 85 percent of their benefits taxable. Thus, since
1993 a married couple filing taxes jointly have had to pay income tax
on up to half their benefits if their gross income is between $32,000
and $44,000, and on up to 85 percent of their benefits if their gross
income exceeds $44,000. ECONOMIC REVIEW • THIRD QUARTER 2002 9
The fraction of beneficiaries affected by these amendments was
originally small. In 1984, only 10 percent of Social Security recipients
were expected to have high enough incomes to pay income tax on their
benefits. To date, the income thresholds in the amendments have been
fixed in nominal terms, so growth in nominal incomes has made the
fraction of beneficiaries paying tax on their benefits grow. By 1993, 18
percent of beneficiaries paid income tax on their benefits.5
The loss of benefits is significant for people with higher incomes.
Table 1 shows the benefit that married couples at four different income
levels and with annual Social Security benefits of $10,000 would have
lost in 2001 to the combined effect of the 1983 and 1993 amend-
ments. The lowest-income couple lost none of their benefits to income
tax, while the highest-income couple lost $2,337.50 or more of their
benefits.6 The magnitude of these losses makes plausible the idea that
taxation of Social Security benefits induced higher income men to
retire later.
Testing whether taxation of benefits has made men retire later
requires comparing participation trends among men who have lost dif-
ferent amounts of benefits to tax. Separating the effect of reduced
benefits from other causes of retirement requires grouping men by an
indicator of their benefit loss that is not affected by retirement age.
Grouping men by income would not achieve this since later retirement
by itself pushes men into higher income groups than they would other-
wise have been in. Men’s education level and race are better indicators
of how much their benefits are taxed, since later retirement does not
Table 1
INCOME TAX ON SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS FOR
MARRIED COUPLES IN 2001 
Annual Dollars
Adjusted Gross Income 27,000 28,000 39,000 44,000
Tax on Social Security Benefit 07 5 750 2,337.5
Notes: Each couple is assumed to receive $10,000 in Social Security benefits annually before tax, and
to file income taxes jointly. Social Security benefit-tax rules are from table 2.A32 of Social Security
Administration (2000). Income tax rates are from the IRS website.10 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
change either of these. Highly educated men are likely on average to
have higher incomes than men with little education, and therefore to
pay more tax on their benefits. White men were also likely on average to
have higher incomes than black men, and thus to have lose more bene-
fits to taxation. 
Comparisons based on education and race show no difference
across groups in participation trends since the 1970s. Participation rates
among men aged 60-64 with different levels of education (Chart 2) all
declined before 1985 but rose after 1995, and to a similar extent.7 The
same pattern in participation rates exists for men aged 65-69 at all levels
of education. It also exists for both black and white men aged 60-64.
To conclude, data show that the trend of declining male labor-force
participation ended around 1985 even for men who were less likely to
pay income tax on their Social Security benefits. Thus taxation of bene-
fits cannot explain why the trend toward earlier retirement ended. 
Chart 2 
LABOR-FORCE PARTICIPATION RATES OF MEN AGED
60-64, BY EDUCATION LEVEL 
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Fears of future reductions in benefits
The reforms of 1983 and 1993, in addition to reducing the value of
benefits, may have provoked fears among workers that future legislation
would further reduce their Social Security benefits. Such expectations of
lower benefits may have prompted some men to delay retirement. 
One way to test whether fears of future reforms were important is
to compare the participation trends among older and younger men.
Older men at the time of the reforms would have been more likely to
die before any further reductions in Social Security benefits occurred.
Indeed, survey data show that older Americans are much more confi-
dent of receiving Social Security benefits than are younger Americans
(Dominitz, Manski, and Heinz). Therefore fears of future reforms
would have been more likely to increase the labor supply of men aged
55-59 than that of men aged 70-74. 
A comparison of the labor supply of these two groups does not
support the idea that fears of future benefit cuts affected retirement
ages. The labor-force participation rate of men aged 70-74 decreased
steadily from 1963 to the late 1980s, but has risen steadily since then.8
By contrast, the participation rate of men aged 55-59 continued to
decline gradually after 1985. Since increases in men’s participation rates
since 1985 are strongest among those aged 65 and older—men who are
least likely to live to see further reductions to Social Security benefits—
fears of such reforms do not appear to have driven the change in the
trend of older men’s participation rates.
Social Security’s penalty for working at age 65 and above
From its creation until 2000, Social Security penalized work at age
65 and above. This penalty was reduced in the 1980s and 1990s, and
then removed entirely in 2000. These changes were expected to increase
labor supply at ages 65 and above, and data show that men at these ages
did indeed retire later as a result.12 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
Specifics of the work penalty. Before 2000, Social Security’s earnings
test removed benefits from workers aged 65 to 69 who claimed bene-
fits and had earnings above a given limit.9 In different periods, the
earnings test withdrew 33 or 50 cents or even a dollar of benefits for
each additional dollar earned. This created a strong disincentive for
men aged 65 to 69 to work and claim benefits at the same time.
Workers at these ages would thus have wished to defer their Social
Security benefits until after they had retired. 
Social Security’s deferred-retirement credit determines the cost of
deferring benefits. Historically this credit was low, so deferring benefits
was costly to workers. For example, when the credit was 3 percent, a
single 65-year-old man who deferred an annual benefit of $10,000 until
age 66 lost $10,000 but gained additional benefits of $300, adjusted for
changes in the cost of living, every year from age 66 until his death. The
value of these payments of $300 can be found in annuity markets, since
Social Security benefits are annuities, ceasing when the beneficiary
dies.10 Using the current real market rate of return on a single-life
annuity for a 65-year-old man, about 6.5 percent, as a guide to past
rates of return, a 65-year-old man could buy an annuity paying an infla-
tion-adjusted $300 per year from age 66 to his death for about
$4,600.11 So when the deferred-retirement credit was only 3 percent, a
65-year-old man who deferred benefits of $10,000 for one year lost
about $5,400 of their value. 
The penalty on working at ages 65 to 69 resulted from the fact that
it was costly for workers at these ages either to claim or defer benefits.
The effective penalty was the minimum of these two costs, so if either
cost fell to zero, the penalty on working disappeared.
Changes to the work penalty. Congress has reduced Social Security’s
penalty to working in two ways. First, it reduced the earnings test’s rate
of benefit withdrawal at ages 65 to 69 from 50 to 33 cents per dollar of
additional earnings in 1990, and finally to zero in 2000. No earnings
test now applies to workers at or above full-retirement age, the age at
which workers are eligible for 100 percent of their benefits, which is
slowly rising from 65 to 67.12
Second, Congress has increased the deferred-retirement credit.
From 1982 to 1990 this credit was 3 percent. Since 1990 it has been
rising steadily and is scheduled to reach a maximum of 8 percent inECONOMIC REVIEW • THIRD QUARTER 2002 13
2009.13 Deferring benefits is costly if the deferred-retirement credit is
lower than the rate of return on private annuities, or in the example
above, about 6.5 percent. Therefore, deferring benefits was costly for a
single 65-year-old man roughly until the deferred-retirement credit
reached 6.5 percent in 2002.
To summarize, Social Security historically penalized working at ages
65 and above. Facing the earnings test and deferring benefits were both
costly to workers. From 1990 to 2000 this penalty fell steadily due to
changes in the earnings test and increases in the deferred-retirement
credit. This penalty was removed altogether by the ending of the earn-
ings test at ages 65 to 69 in 2000.
The effect of reductions in the work penalty. The effect of these
reforms on retirement decisions can be tested by comparing labor-force
participation rates at ages 64 and 65. There has been little change over
time to Social Security’s earnings test and deferral credits at ages 62 to
64. Therefore, if the removal of penalties to work reduced the male
retirement rate at age 65, male participation rates at age 65 would move
closer to those at age 64.
This comparison of labor-force participation rates at 64 and 65
shows that the tendency for men to retire at age 65 has fallen over time.
In 1980 the participation rate at age 65 was only 72 percent as high as
that at age 64, showing that many men retired at exactly age 65 (Chart
3). By 2001, however, the participation rate at age 65 was 88 percent as
high as that at age 64. This declining tendency for men working at age
64 to retire at age 65 also likely increased rates of male labor supply at
ages above 65.
The most plausible cause of lower retirement rates at age 65 is the
decline in Social Security’s work penalty. This is difficult to prove statis-
tically, however, since the retirement rate at age 65 declined gradually,
rather than suddenly after a reform. Indeed, one study found that
changes in the earnings test did not affect male labor-force participation
at ages above 65 (Gruber and Orszag). However, of all possible causes of
a lower retirement rate at age 65, only Social Security reforms seem
likely to have affected a large number of men at precisely age 65.
The size of the response to lower penalties for working appears small
compared to the general change in the trend of older men’s labor-force
participation. A general change in male participation trends occurred in14 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
1985 at ages 62 and above. The change in the participation trend is only
about 6 percent stronger at age 65 than at age 64 (appendix). Therefore
the reduction of penalties to work at ages 65 through 69 can only
explain around 6 percent of the change in the trend of men’s labor
supply at these ages.
III. THE EFFECT OF CHANGES IN PRIVATE PENSIONS
Defined-benefit pensions are thought to encourage early retire-
ment, while defined-contribution pensions are not, because it is often
costly to defer a defined-benefit pension, while it is rarely costly to defer
a defined-contribution pension. Over the past 25 years, defined-benefit
employer pensions have become less common, and defined-contribu-
tion pensions more common. The decline of defined-benefit pensions
could have contributed to the end of the trend toward early retirement.
Chart 3 
LABOR-FORCE PARTICIPATION RATES OF MEN AGED
64 AND 65
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Retirement incentives in employer pensions
Defined-benefit employer pensions pay benefits determined by a
formula created by each employer. These formulas imply an accrual
factor by which pensions are multiplied in value if they are deferred.
Most defined-benefit pensions pay benefits in the form of annuities, so
pension accrual is generally equivalent to acquiring additional annuities.
Thus, as in the case of Social Security, the employer’s pension formula
makes deferring a pension costly to workers if the reward for deferral,
the accrual factor, is less than the rate of return on private annuities. 
In practice, the accrual factor is often lower than the rate of return on
private annuities. Data from the Surveys of Consumer Finances of 1983
and 1988 reveal that the accrual factor in employers’ defined-benefit plans
typically fell below the rate of return on private annuities at age 62
(Gustman and Steinmeier). Therefore, at least in these years, it was typi-
cally costly for workers to defer claiming these pensions beyond age 62. 
A cost of deferring a current employer’s pension creates an incentive
to quit that employer if doing so is necessary to claim the pension.
Restrictions on claiming pensions arise both from employers’ rules and
from the tax code. Most defined-benefit pensions have an early-retire-
ment age at which pensions can first be claimed, and a higher normal
retirement age. The Internal Revenue Code removes corporate pension
funds’ privileged tax status if pensions are paid to workers who are
younger than their plan’s normal retirement age and who still work for
their employer. Therefore, firms require that employees quit before
receiving their pensions. Employers typically also bar workers older
than their plan’s normal retirement age from working and drawing a
pension concurrently.14
While defined-contribution pensions also typically require that
workers leave their employers before claiming their pensions, they gen-
erally do not create incentives for workers to quit. This is because the
cost of deferring a defined-contribution pension is low. These pensions
increase in value as they are deferred according to the rate of new con-
tributions and the market’s rate of return to assets held within the
pension. Workers would not be able significantly to improve on this
rate of return on existing assets outside of their pension accounts.1516 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
Thus employees with defined-contribution pensions have little incen-
tive to quit their employers to be able to withdraw funds from their
pensions earlier. 
Due to this difference in incentives, moving from defined-benefit
to defined-contribution pensions may reduce older workers’ rates of
quitting long-term employers. Reforming the tax code to allow claim-
ing an employer’s pension while continuing to work for that employer
would have the same effect.16 Workers who quit their long-term
employers are free to take other jobs, and thus need not retire. However,
since it may be difficult for older workers to adapt to new jobs, a lower
rate of separations from long-term employers is likely to lead to lower
retirement rates. 
Evidence on the retirement effect of declining defined-benefit 
pension coverage
Studies of micro data have found that workers in pension plans
with higher penalties for deferral tend to retire earlier (Samwick; Fried-
berg and Webb). Since penalties for deferral are often higher in
defined-benefit than defined-contribution pensions, the declining cov-
erage of defined-benefit pensions since 1980 may have contributed to
the changed trend of older men’s labor supply since then.
Whether the declining membership of defined-benefit pensions
explains the changed trend of older men’s labor supply can be tested by
comparing the two variables’ time paths. The membership of defined-
benefit pensions would have to have fallen dramatically around 1985 to
explain the end of the trend toward earlier male retirement.
This test does not support an effect of the changing type of
employer pensions on male labor supply. The proportion of workers
with defined-benefit employer pensions fell steadily from 1980 to 1997,
while the proportion with defined-contribution employer pensions
increased steadily (Chart 4). There was no change in either trend
around 1985. Therefore the decline in the membership of defined-
benefit pensions began too early to have been the main cause of the
changed trend in older men’s labor supply. IV. THE EFFECT OF SLOWER GROWTH IN THE U.S.
LABOR FORCE
The growth rate of the U.S. labor force has slowed dramatically
since the 1970s. Slower labor-force growth means all workers can
command higher wages. In the short run, higher wages will lead older
men to supply more labor and retire later. 
Growth in the U.S. labor force averaged 2.7 percent per year in the
1970s, but slowed to an average of 1.6 percent in the 1980s and 1.1
percent in the 1990s (Chart 5). The entry into the labor market of large
numbers of women and of the baby-boom birth cohort caused rapid
labor force growth in the 1970s. Slower growth of the female labor
force and smaller birth cohorts after the baby boom led to slower labor-
force growth in the 1980s and 1990s. 
In the short run, slower labor-force growth will likely lead to later
retirement. Slower labor-force growth will tend to raise wages, as each
worker has more capital to work with and is thus more productive.17
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Chart 4 
PROPORTION OF LABOR FORCE WITH DEFINED-
BENEFIT AND DEFINED-CONTRIBUTION PENSIONS 
Notes: Each worker appears on only one curve. Some workers with one type of main pension also
had supplementary pensions of the other type.
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Higher wages will lead men to decrease their leisure hours in favor of
more consumption. As a result, they will supply more labor, in part by
delaying retirement.
In the longer run, however, slower labor-force growth is likely to have
little or no effect on retirement ages. If slower labor-force growth increases
wages for a long period, each generation of older men will have enjoyed
high wages their entire lives and will therefore be relatively wealthy.
Higher wages are less likely to tempt wealthier workers to retire later. This
wealth effect explains why men retire much earlier today than they did in
1950, even though wages are much higher today than they were then.18
Theory thus suggests that slowing labor-force growth may raise
older men’s labor-force participation only in the short term. Although
older men’s labor-force participation may trend down for other
reasons, there should be a negative correlation between the growth rate




Notes: Annual growth rates are average annual growth rates over the preceding five years. Projections
are average annual growth rates over the projection period.
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U.S. data give weak support to this theory. As the theory predicts,
older men’s labor-force participation fell rapidly in the 1970s (as already
shown in Chart 1). At the same time, the labor force grew rapidly
(Chart 5). Older men’s participation stabilized in the 1980s and 1990s,
when the labor force grew more slowly. However, older men’s participa-
tion rates fell in the 1950s and 1960s, despite slow labor-force growth.
There was also no change in the labor-force growth rate in 1985 that
would explain why the participation trend changed precisely then, as
regression analysis confirms (appendix). 
Thus, as with changes to Social Security and private pensions,
slower labor-force growth may have contributed to greater labor supply
by older men. But the trend of labor-force growth does not appear to
have caused the change in the male retirement trend in 1985. 
V. OTHER THEORIES OF WHY THE MALE
RETIREMENT TREND CHANGED
Of the theories discussed so far, only reforms to Social Security
appear to have altered male retirement behavior, and these only at ages
65 and above. Since much of the change in the male retirement trend
remains a puzzle, this section considers some other suggested explana-
tions. These explanations relate to the business cycle, changes in
longevity and the physical demands of work, and an increased taste for
work among older men. 
Economic booms and thus expanded employment opportunities
may induce later retirement. From 1964 to 1998, lower unemployment
rates were associated with higher participation rates among older men.
However, there was also a significant break in participation trends in
1985 even controlling for the unemployment rate (Quinn). Thus the
business cycle does not explain this change in trends.
Greater longevity and lower physical requirements of work have
also been suggested as causes of later retirement since 1985 (Quinn).19
Yet male life expectancy at birth has increased in every decade since at
least 1900, and the physical demands of work have also likely declined
steadily over a long period.20 Therefore these variables do not appear to
explain the change in the male retirement trend around 1985.20 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
A final explanation for later male retirement is that older men’s taste
for work has increased since the early 1980s. It does not appear possible
to test whether this is true. Neither is it clear why men’s taste for work
should have increased around 1985 rather than at any other time.
Survey data suggest, however, that older people are motivated to
work more by the enjoyment work brings than by pecuniary considera-
tions. Of respondents to the 2002 Retirement Confidence Survey who
said they had worked for pay since retirement, 56 percent said they did
so because they “enjoy working and want to stay involved.” Only 11
percent said they were “wanting money to make ends meet.”21 Similarly,
work at higher ages is concentrated among the wealthy, who have less
need for extra earnings (Haider and Loughram). These findings are con-
sistent with the idea that trends in work at higher ages could be driven
more by tastes than by economic incentives.
VI. CONCLUSION
Older American men supplied more labor after 1985 than was
expected from previous trends. Reductions in penalties for working
created by Social Security have decreased retirement rates at age 65.
However, data show little effect of reductions in Social Security benefits,
changes to private pensions, or the decreased rate of labor-force growth
on male retirement trends. Recent cohorts of older men may have had a
greater taste for work than previous cohorts, but it is not clear why
tastes would change in precisely 1985. Therefore much of the reversal of
the trend of reduced labor supply by older men remains a puzzle. 
The future trend of male retirement ages will substantially affect the
size of the U.S. labor force, and thus the capacity of its economy. Some
economists argue that the participation trend since 1985 is merely a
hiatus in the long-run decline of male retirement ages, which will
resume soon (Costa). But the longer the trend in male retirement ages is
stable or rising, the more puzzling it will be. Because little of the change
in the trend has, to date, been explained, policymakers should be careful
about basing policy on the assumption that male retirement ages will
continue to increase.ECONOMIC REVIEW • THIRD QUARTER 2002 21
APPENDIX: REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF U.S. MALE
LABOR-FORCE PARTICIPATION RATES
This appendix describes an empirical method for testing theories of
the break in the male retirement trend. It also tests some of the theories
the article discusses. It then analyzes how much of the change in the
trend of male labor-force participation at age 65 reflects reductions in
Social Security’s penalty for working at that age.
Empirical method
The empirical method used here and by Quinn (1999) is to regress
male labor-force participation rates on a time trend, a trend-break term,
which is another time trend starting in 1985, and other explanatory
variables. The coefficient on the trend-break term shows how much the
trend of male participation rates changed in 1985. The other explana-
tory variables would explain the change in the participation trend if
their inclusion in the model made the trend-break coefficient statisti-
cally insignificant. 
Regressions of participation rates on the rates of unemployment
and labor-force growth may suffer endogeneity bias, since unemploy-
ment and labor-force growth are endogenous to older men’s labor-force
participation rates. To minimize endogeneity bias, the dependent vari-
ables used here are labor-force participation rates of men at single years
of age. Because men at a single year of age account for a small share of
total labor supply, their participation should have minimal effects on
overall unemployment and labor-force growth rates.
Regressions to test the theories
The table shows tests of the effects of unemployment rates, labor-
force growth rates, the proportion of workers with defined-benefit
pensions, and Social Security’s penalty on working at age 65 on male
labor-force participation trends. In column 1, the year coefficient shows
the participation rate of men aged 62 fell by 1.4 percentage points per
year until 1985. The significant coefficient on the trend-break term
shows behavior changed around 1985. The trend after 1985 is the sum22 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
of the coefficients on the year and trend-break terms, so participation
was roughly constant after 1985. Neither the unemployment rate nor
the growth rate of the labor force affected participation significantly.
Column 2 shows that the proportion of the labor force with defined-
benefit pensions did not affect participation at age 62 significantly.
Thus, these explanatory variables do not explain the change in partici-
pation trends at age 62.
Column 3 regresses participation of men aged 65 on unemployment
and labor-force growth rates, and on Social Security’s penalty for work at
age 65. This penalty is calculated from the history of Social Security’s
earnings test and deferred-retirement credit as a percentage of the wage
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: PERCENT LABOR-FORCE
PARTICIPATION RATE OF US MEN BY AGE
12 34
Dependent variable Age 62 Age 62 Age 65 Age 65 
Year -1.4** -1.5** -1.2** -.7**
(.1) (.3) (.1) (.2)
Trend break: Years after 1984 1.4** 0.9** 1.2** 1.2**
(.1) (.3) (.2) (.2)
Unemployment rate -.4* -.2 -.8** -.7**
(.2) (.3) (.2) (.2)
Average annual growth rate of labor  -.5 .4 -2.3** -1.3
force over last five years, percent (.6) (1.9) (.6) (1.3)
Percent of workers with DB pensions -.5 .5
(.6) (.4)
Social Security’s penalty on work at age 65,  -.1
percent of wage (.1)
R
2 .98 .94 .98 .91
N3 7 2 3 3 7 2 3
Sample period 1965-2001 1975-97 1965-2001 1975-97
Notes: All regressions include a constant. Standard errors are in parentheses. The sample period is
shorter for regressions including the percentage of men with DB pensions, since data for this variable
are only available for 1975-97.
**Denotes coefficients significant at the 5 percent level, * at the 10 percent level.ECONOMIC REVIEW • THIRD QUARTER 2002 23
of a man with average male wages and Social Security benefits. Higher
unemployment reduces participation at age 65, consistent with Quinn’s
findings. Higher labor-force growth appears to reduce participation at
age 65, though this effect is not consistent across specifications. Social
Security’s penalty on work has no statistically significant effect because
participation rates did not respond quickly to changes in it. In column 4,
the percentage of the population with defined-benefit pensions has no
significant effect on participation rates at age 65. Since the trend break in
1985 remains strongly significant when unemployment, labor-force
growth rates, Social Security’s work penalty, and trends in private pen-
sions are included in the model, none of these variables fully explains the
changed trend of participation rates at age 65. 
The effect of reductions in Social Security’s work penalty at age 65
Chart 3 suggests reductions in Social Security’s implicit tax at age
65 have reduced retirement rates at 65. This effect was small compared
to the general change in trends, however. Regressions of participation at
ages 64 and 65 on the year and a trend break in 1985 give trend-break
terms of 1.7 and 1.8, respectively. Assuming there was a general trend
change of 1.7 percentage points per year, only (1.8-1.7)/1.8, or 6
percent, of the trend change at age 65 is due to lower implicit Social
Security taxes at age 65. Thus the fall in retirement rates at age 65 is a
small change compared to the general change in the trend of male
labor-force participation rates at ages 60 and above. 24 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
ENDNOTES
1 This is the number of men in the age groups 55-59, 60-64 and 65-69 who
would not have worked in 2001 had participation rates in each age group
declined after 1985 at their average rates of decline from 1957 to 1985.
2 This article defines retirement as leaving the labor force. In contrast, some
literature defines it as quitting a long-term employer, perhaps to join another
employer. The article also treats rising labor-force participation rates at higher
ages as being synonymous with rising retirement ages. Gendell constructs an
“average age of retirement” which can fall as participation rates rise, but Johnson
shows this construct has a variety of problems.
3 Labor-force participation rates of older American women have risen fairly
steadily over time, though the rate of increase of older women’s labor-force partic-
ipation increased around 1985 (Quinn). Since there is less of a puzzle in the
behavior of older women’s labor supply, this article concentrates on men’s behavior. 
4 Since people with higher incomes pay more income tax on their Social
Security benefits, the inclusion of benefits in taxable income may have created a
disincentive to work for some people. However, since interest income is also part
of adjusted gross income, even beneficiaries who no longer work could lose bene-
fits to income tax.
5 The Social Security Historian’s Office’s Research Note No. 12 quotes these
percentages of beneficiaries paying tax on their benefits
(www.ssa.gov/history/taxationofbenefits.html).
6 Table 1 shows incomes in the 0 percent, 15 percent and 27.5 percent
income tax brackets in 2001. Social Security beneficiaries in higher income tax
brackets pay higher tax rates on their benefits. 
7 It has been suggested that the increasing level of education among men
entering the 60-64 age group explains their changed retirement trend. Data do
not support this hypothesis; as Chart 2 shows, the participation-rate trends have
changed at each education level.
8 Labor-force participation rates of men aged 70-74 are not widely published
but are available from the Bureau of Labor Statistics on request.
9 Workers aged 70 or more were exempt from the earnings test from 1983 on.
10 Social Security also pays benefits to surviving spouses and dependent children.
11 The website www.immediateannuity.com quotes an average rate of return
for a nominal single-life immediate-payout annuity for a 65-year-old American
man of 9.3 percent in 2002. If inflation is expected to average 2.5-3 percent over
the annuitant’s remaining life, this implies a real rate of return of 6.3-6.8 percent.
12 The increase in the full-retirement age cannot explain the change in partici-
pation trends at ages 60 and above around 1985. It reduces the benefits of all peo-
ple born in or after 1938, so the first men to be affected did not turn 60 until 1998.
13 The deferred-retirement credit applies from full-retirement age upward.
The credit reaches 8 percent for people born in and after 1943. People born in
1943 will reach full-retirement age in 2009.
14 Department of Labor (2000) notes that employers rarely allow employees
who are older than their plan’s normal retirement age to claim pensions without
first quitting their jobs.ECONOMIC REVIEW • THIRD QUARTER 2002 25
15 Most defined-contribution pensions restrict workers’ choice of assets
somewhat. These restrictions are not thought to depress returns within defined-
contribution accounts much below those available elsewhere.
16 The Phased Retirement Liberalization Act, H.R. 4837, introduced on July
12, 2000, by Senator Charles Grassley and Representative Earl Pomeroy, would
reform the Internal Revenue Code to permit employers to allow workers to draw
pensions while remaining employed starting at age 59 1/2, after 30 years of ser-
vice, or at the firm’s normal retirement age, whichever came first. This act did not
pass in 2000, but is expected to be reintroduced.
17 For example, comparing steady states of the Solow growth model, the real
wage is higher if the rate of population (and hence labor-force) growth is lower.
18 This implies that the slow growth of the U.S. labor force predicted to
2025 (Chart 5) and indeed for the indefinite future is unlikely to increase older
Americans’ labor supply.
19 Quinn also suggests that the banning of mandatory retirement rules con-
tributed to the changed trend of male retirement. However, the minimum age of
mandatory retirement was raised from 65 to 70 in 1978, too early to explain a
change in behavior in 1985.
20 Estimated life expectancies at birth in the U.S. from 1900 to 1997 are
given by the National Vital Statistics Report, Vol. 47, No.28 (1999), at
www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvs47_28.pdf.
21 The Retirement Confidence Survey is a conducted by the Employee
Benefit Research Institute, and was started in 1991. Answers to this question of
the 2002 RCS are at www.asec.org/research/rcs/2002/riafs.pdf.26 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
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